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Abstract 
 
Increased reliance on wearables using Bluetooth 
requires additional security and privacy measures to 
protect these devices and personal data, regardless of 
device vendor. Most wearables lack the ability to 
monitor their communication connections and protect 
personal data without assistance. Attackers can force 
wearables to disconnect from base stations. When a 
wearable loses its connection to its base station, an 
attacker can connect to the wearable to steal stored 
personal data or await reconnection to the base station 
to eavesdrop on communications. If the base station 
inadvertently disconnects from the cloud serving a 
security-aware app, it would be unable to respond to a 
rapid change in the security of its current environment. 
We design a personal fog incorporating wearables, a 
base station, and the cloud that allows the wearable to 
be situationally aware and manage inter- and intra-fog 
communications, given local personal fogs with the 
same app.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Bluetooth devices, such as wearables, have become 
ubiquitous in day-to-day life. With this ubiquity comes 
a rush to get devices to market quickly, often at the 
cost of good security and privacy standards. Many of 
the devices currently available use the basic built-in 
Bluetooth security. While this has been improved over 
each new version of the Bluetooth security standard, 
there are many known holes in the previous and current 
standard [7] to necessitate a method of preventing an 
attacker from gaining personal information from user 
devices. Additionally, with an Ubertooth One [8], an 
open-source hardware device capable of intercepting 
Bluetooth transmission, and crackle [2], an open-
sourced software program which can decrypt Bluetooth 
communication packets, an attacker can gain personal 
data by intercepting device communications using the 
built-in Bluetooth standards. 
Without additional security features, many devices 
are open to interference from malicious users. For 
example, an attacker can force the disconnection of a 
wearable from its base station. Once disconnected, the 
attacker can intercept the pairing packets and gain a 
user’s personal information without any alert to the 
user. This method can be exploited to great effect if the 
wearable is transmitting very sensitive data. If 
wearables rely only on default Bluetooth standards, 
they won’t be equipped to prevent attackers from using 
this exploit. More advanced wearables, such as the 
Apple Watch 2, can operate for some period without 
connection to their base station. As these 
advancements proliferate, they open additional attack 
vectors for disconnected, but still operable, wearables. 
If a base station connected to a wearable has a 
method of recognizing its environments’ insecurity, it 
would still have major issues in practical use. First, it 
would need to rely heavily on users informing the 
application that they are unsafe in their current 
environment. This makes this solution far less effective 
for users that do not have the expertise to properly 
evaluate the risk present in their current environment. 
However, users without the proper expertise could 
rely on cloud-computed rules that dictate which 
environments are unsafe. These rules could be 
computed from data that is provided to our application 
by users who are particularly security conscious. Even 
with enough security conscious users, there are no 
guarantees that users would be able to receive updates 
to their application to utilize the new rules being 
created as there are many situations where users would 
have poor-to-no cloud-connectivity. In environments 
where users cannot receive updated rules it is possible 
that they would be transmitting personal data even 
though their environment had already been deemed 
unsafe by the cloud. Finally, as most current wearables 
are unable to differentiate if a connected device is truly 
secure, any information stored on the device could be 
requested by an attacker who connected to a 
disconnected wearable.  
To increase the security of these devices, we need 
wearables that are capable of better managing their 
own Bluetooth connections without requiring direct 
user involvement. Relieving the security and 
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 situational awareness burden from the user requires 
management facilities such as knowledge of the 
devices to which it is currently connected, the ability to 
establish new connections to other devices that are not 
its base station, refuse incoming connections, and 
terminate established connections. This additional 
computing power on the edge (i.e. at the wearable) 
would allow the introduction of these facilities to 
increase personal security and privacy of wearable 
operation and data. 
Even with this added power at the edge, current 
consumer wearables require unique APIs for use with 
each device, requiring developers to create applications 
with different code when a new device is introduced. 
This makes it difficult to develop a generic solution 
which will work on multiple devices, and necessitates 
looking at the direction wearables are moving. 
In this paper, we introduce a concept of a personal 
fog computing system as part of the quantified self. It 
requires elevating a wearable to a computational 
device, which has already been shown to be feasible 
with the Apple Watch 2. Adding computational power 
to the edge via the wearable, a personal fog introduces 
wearable autonomy for security protection. This 
architecture contrasts with most of today’s wearables, 
which solely rely on their base station.  
A personal fog has additional benefits. Situational 
awareness can be enhanced by creating a security app, 
downloadable by a wearable, where nearby personal 
fog networks can detect app advertisement and inform 
another’s wearable when a social environment is 
insecure. If a wearable becomes disconnected from its 
base station, either inadvertently or maliciously, we 
describe a method for temporarily fostering wearable 
devices in nearby personal fogs that share the security 
app. Fostering, in this scenario, means sending a single 
packet to “quiet” a rogue wearable in an insecure 
environment until it can reconnect to its base station.  
The app also allows the home base station to quiet its 
wearables. We demonstrate how this solution works by 
implementing it in a small-scale testing environment 
and simulating a large-scale application. We analyze 
our application as it relates to the CIA triad of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  
 
2. Background  
 
Kattepur et al. [6] examined the use of fog 
computing to improve battery life and network 
communication speed of robots performing a 
computationally intensive task. Using the fog, they 
improved latency of communication by 77% when 
sorting information and they achieved a 54% 
improvement to battery life. This method shows the 
improvements that are possible even with similar 
processing power at each level of the fog, as the same 
robots were used for all fog layers. They did not test 
their solution in the real world, however, so it is 
possible issues which could not be simulated may 
occur when attempting to use this method. 
Hong et al. [5] describe a generic fog system 
allowing custom code to be loaded into general fog 
machines based on their location via a simple appkey. 
This system allows developers to deploy their systems 
to fog devices which are already in the locations they 
are targeting. This system would allow our solution to 
adapt to security threats more quickly. However, their 
only test of their system was in simulation.  
Vaquero and Rodero-Merino [9] provide a useful 
definition of what the fog really is. Their discussion on 
what it means to be a fog is vital to the development of 
the fog. They settled on a model needing ubiquitous 
devices communicating with each other to perform 
storage and processing automatically, rewarding users 
who allow their devices to be part of this system. Yi et 
al. [12] provided a survey of fog computing concepts, 
applications, and potential issues in design and 
implementation of a fog computing system based on 
this definition.  
Giang et al. [4] designed a flexible fog computing 
model for use with VANETs. Because VANETs suffer 
from high latency, using the fog by including 
processing on the edge would limit the amount of data 
which needs to be transmitted and, because of the 
proximity to processing nodes, lowers the latency of 
the communication between car and network. This 
paper does not address the issue with a network where 
nodes drop in and out. 
There has been work on wearable devices in 
situations which may require our automatic method of 
quieting devices. Abie and Balasingham [1] focused on 
the creation of a framework for Internet of Things 
devices in the healthcare industry. Their system 
focused on wearable sensors communicating with a 
smartphone which would pass this data on to a 
healthcare professional. This system would be a prime 
target for attackers wishing to steal personal data and 
would likely include many users who are not conscious 
of Bluetooth security practices. This type of system 
directly motivated this work. 
 
3. Prior efforts  
 
3.1. Original solution 
 
Previously, we created an application specific to the 
Apple iPhone that adapted the state of its Bluetooth 
communications based on the perceived security of its 
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 current environment [10]. The application collects as 
much data as it can from the iPhone and its connected 
wearables to determine if it is in an insecure 
environment. Once informed of a potential threat, the 
iPhone maintains a connection to the wearable but does 
not send additional information or request information 
from the wearable until it detected or is informed it is 
in a secure environment. Maintaining the connection 
without information sharing requires the sending of 
exclusively empty packets. An example is shown in 
Figure 1. In this case, the phone is in an insecure 
environment only for communication with a Bluetooth 
headset and was considered secure if the headset was 
not connected, as seen in Figure 1a. Once the headset 
was connected however, the phone recognized the 
insecure environment and stopped sending data to the 
now connected Bluetooth headset, as seen in Figure 1b.  
This method is viable primarily because wearables 
contain storage on the device to collect data when a 
device is disconnected from its base station. Thus, the 
application can stop sending data without losing any 
important information the wearable might still collect. 
Different wearables have different amounts of storage 
for their data, but most can store more than two days’ 
worth of data before overwriting. 
 
 
Figure 1. iPhone application a) before 
adaptation and b) after adaptation 
 
There were issues with this method. First, we chose 
to work with the Apple iPhone, as it is seen by 
developers as the most restrictive platform for app 
development and it is widely used by consumers. 
Porting the application to less restrictive OSs proved 
difficult. For example, the Android framework does 
not allow for specific knowledge of connected 
Bluetooth devices at runtime, requiring workarounds to 
learn what devices are connected.  
3.2. Adding the cloud 
 
To provide a more variable ruleset for wearable 
adaptation while in an insecure environment and 
introduce crowd-sourcing to improve and hasten 
wearable knowledge regarding such environments, we 
extended our app to use cloud-based machine learning 
algorithms to adjust to newly-forming insecure 
environments [11]. This method allowed the app to 
operate regardless of connection to the cloud, as all 
rules would be stored on the device and updated when 
a connection could be reestablished.  
The app took a snapshot of its current state at 
regular intervals. Snapshots included the connected 
devices, all information available to the phone, either 
from the wearable (e.g. heartrate) or from the phone 
itself (e.g. time), and the current security state of the 
environment. The snapshots were passed to our cloud-
based machine learning algorithm, which would use 
existing snapshots to learn to identify potential 
insecure environments. The results of this learning 
were then translated into rules for use in our app.  
Our approach stored all rules on a single cloud 
service which was queried periodically to see if the 
current environment was secure. This method was 
accurate when predicting if an environment was 
insecure and, with the low risk of Wi-Fi encryption 
being broken for secure communication, making it a 
good option for predicting if the phones current 
environment is insecure.  
While the use of a cloud-based machine learning 
algorithm improved the speed at which newly insecure 
environments were discovered, it still allowed for a 
window of time where devices were susceptible. For 
example, if an attacker is sniffing Bluetooth traffic in a 
coffee shop, the cloud would not be able to truly adapt 
to this problem quickly. It would only allow those who 
told the app they were insecure to be secure until the 
cloud was able to “catch up” and tell the other users. 
Thus, an attacker can stay in one place and collect 
information from users who believe they are secure 
until the cloud is able to recognize the newly insecure 
environment. Once discovered, the attacker is free to 
move to a new location which is marked by the cloud 
as secure and start eavesdropping on the 
communications there.  
Another issue with this extension was the inability 
of our app to work for all Bluetooth devices. Because 
many Bluetooth device manufacturers create custom 
APIs for interacting with their devices, we were forced 
to create custom code for each device tested. While it 
was possible to prevent communication with these 
devices, the lack of a generalized Bluetooth API 
prevented us from creating an app that would work 
with every Bluetooth device currently on the market.  
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 3.3. Addressing confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability 
 
Our previous app focused on the confidentiality and 
integrity of wearable data by preventing data which 
may be intercepted from being transmitted in insecure 
environments. In both our original solution and the 
improved cloud-based solution, we maintained the 
focus on confidentiality and integrity of the data by 
protecting what was streamed from a wearable device 
to its base station. The drawback is that the data is not 
immediately available when the wearables are forced 
to send empty packets. 
 
4. Designing the personal fog 
 
4.1. Increasing wearable computational power 
 
Informing users of a potentially insecure 
environment should be done as rapidly as possible, 
especially when they are trusting an app to have this 
knowledge.  Relying solely on a cloud service based on 
crowd sourcing means such an app would assume it 
was secure until enough users determined they were 
insecure for our cloud service to learn of a new 
insecure environment. This type of service also 
requires large numbers of users to be engaged in their 
environment and recognize potential insecurities. In 
addition, it requires constant connectivity to obtain 
information from the cloud and to prevent an attacker 
from accessing data stored on a “quieted” wearable.  
To address these pitfalls while retaining the 
benefits of the prior work, we extend our app, 
including the cloud service usage, to a new 
computation and communication model. Moving the 
traditional quantified-self architecture to a personal fog 
is illustrated in Figure 2. The difference in the models 
appears slight, but the personal fog capitalizes on edge 
computing to increase Bluetooth security and privacy. 
The new model allows for rapid communication of 
insecure environments while focusing on the privacy of 
a user’s personal identifying information, moving some 
of the burden of situational awareness from the user to 
the wearable. By increasing the computational power 
on the edge, the wearables can become aware of other 
wearables using the app, as well as their state if 
disconnected, either from the cloud or their base 
station. This increased computational power also 
allows the wearable to process data by checking 
against XML rules provided by the app and stored on 
the device based on the sensor capabilities of the 
wearable. For example, if a wearable has access to 
heartrate sensors, any rules related to heartrate will be 
stored on the device and checked to ensure that, should 
the wearable be in an insecure environment, it will not 
transmit any personal information which may lead to 
the user of the wearable being identified. 
 
Figure 2. Left - current quantified-self model 
Right - personal fog with wearables model 
 
Where the traditional quantified-self has its edge 
devices as the phones, wearable edge devices with 
increased computing power can now process the data 
collected from their own sensors before sending that 
information to the phone. Unlike our previous work, 
this allows the wearable to package its snapshot 
information separately from the phone. The phone can 
perform additional data processing on the stream of 
information it is receiving, such as compressing the 
snapshots from the wearable device or checking device 
specific security rules, before sending to the cloud. As 
before, the cloud will return information on the 
predicted security of the phone and the wearables 
environment, along with learned security rules for the 
devices to follow. With that information, the phone can 
secure itself, as before. However, with increased 
wearable processing power, we can push security and 
privacy information directly to the wearables, allowing 
for finer grained adaptations at the edge. 
Another benefit of the personal fog concept is the 
increased ability to ensure wearables can operate 
securely in insecure environments by incorporating 
wearable situational awareness and intelligence of their 
current security state. If wearables are connected to 
their base station when they enter an insecure 
environment, the method previously used works to 
control transmission. However, it poses a problem if 
the wearable inadvertently disconnects from its base 
station before entering an insecure environment. In this 
case, the wearable would have no knowledge of its 
environmental state and could allow an attacker to 
connect and request data directly from the device. 
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 Without information about its current state, the 
disconnected, and more powerful, wearable could not 
stop its communication. Our approach to resolve this 
issue is to enable wearables to communicate with valid 
base stations external to their initial fog, while still 
maintaining privacy and adapting without divulging 
any personal information. We label this interaction as 
fostering fog devices and describe a design and 
implementation of how it can be performed. 
 
4.2. Fostering devices between fogs 
 
Similar to VANETs [4], we establish dynamic 
computational networks between personal fogs to 
perform the fostering. We provide no guarantees that 
specific connections will remain static or that the 
topology of our fog networks will remain the same 
over time. The objective is to implement a network that 
is flexible while remaining true to the fog computing 
paradigm. However, unlike many other applications of 
the fog, our specific problem domain can contain a 
multitude of fog networks each with unknown and 
non-rigid topologies.  
We have designed a set of protocols for fostering 
that use nearby personal fog networks to better aid the 
security of our app users by allowing, not only 
temporary connections between either two nodes in the 
same personal fog network, but also between two 
nodes that do not share a personal fog network. The 
temporary connections made by fostering last only 
long enough to inform the disconnected node of a 
potentially insecure environment before disconnecting, 
ensuring no transfer of personally identifying 
information between the nodes.  
Our communication protocols create temporary 
connections in one of three ways.  
• Foster a disconnected wearable with nearby 
base station 
• Foster a base station disconnected from the 
cloud with a nearby base station 
• Allow two disconnected wearables in the same 
fog to directly communicate 
 
4.2.1. Wearable fostering. To secure wearable 
devices that become disconnected from their base 
station, as seen in Figure 3, we have designed a 
protocol that would allow for connected personal fog 
networks to temporarily foster another network’s 
disconnected wearable device. Through this protocol, 
base stations in each personal fog network can accept 
incoming connection requests to foster a disconnected 
wearable by advertising an app specific service known 
to all devices running our app. 
When a wearable becomes disconnected from its 
base station, it first attempts to discover other base 
stations in the area advertising the app service. If a 
base station which is in an insecure environment 
receives a fostering request, it will inform the wearable 
of the state of the environment to which the wearable 
will respond by adapting its state. The devices will 
then disconnect. 
 
 
Figure 3. Wearable fostering. Left shows an 
unsafe personal fog (purple), right shows a 
disconnected fog device (green) being 
fostered 
 
4.2.2. Base station fostering. If a base station is 
having trouble connecting to the cloud for new 
updates, it will attempt to establish a connection with 
the base station of another personal fog network in the 
vicinity, as seen in Figure 4. The disconnected base 
station attempts to discover nearby base stations 
advertising the app specific service. Once a connection 
has been established, the base stations can share with 
each other their knowledge about the environment and 
adapt their state, as well as the state of their personal 
fog. Such communication events could be triggered 
through one base station receiving an update from the 
cloud, from user input, or from another personal fog 
network if one of the networks were to have multiple 
external base station connections. 
 
 
Figure 4. Fostering a base station. Left shows 
an unsafe personal fog network (purple) 
communicating this to an unaware network 
(green) on right 
 
With this same method, certain base stations can 
have embedded app rules to be proactive and use the 
advertised service to alert other nearby personal fog 
networks that the environment is unsafe, for quicker 
adaptation. Base stations are not required to reflect the 
changes proposed by other personal fog networks, but 
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 through this protocol each user can make more 
informed decisions about the risk present to their own 
wearable devices given the alerts received when using 
our app. 
 
4.2.3. Intra-fog fostering. Sibling wearables in a 
single personal fog can connect to one another, as seen 
in Figure 5 to share security awareness. Typically, all 
wearables in a personal fog are connected to a base 
station within that network. These base stations are 
responsible for quieting the wearables in the network if 
the environment is deemed to be unsafe (as discussed 
in Section 3). However, if some of the wearables 
become disconnected from their base station then it is 
possible that they would not be properly quieted when 
the other wearables are, which can increase 
vulnerability to attack at both the wearable and the 
personal fog.  
 
 
Figure 5. Intra-fog communication. Right 
shows a wearable (purple) informing its fog 
neighbor (green) it is unsafe 
 
To prevent this situation, after a wearable has been 
quieted from a base station outside its personal fog, it 
subsequently attempts to establish a connection to its 
sibling wearable devices to inform them of the change 
in the environment. Wearable devices in each personal 
fog network advertise a unique service known only to 
members of that personal fog, restricting discovery. 
Once a wearable device has been quieted, it can 
attempt to discover other wearables which have not 
been quieted through this advertising. This 
communication technique is also useful if multiple 
wearables in the same fog become disconnected 
simultaneously and become fostered by different base 
stations. Following this protocol, disconnected siblings 
can work together to better secure the wearables of 
their own personal network. 
 
4.3. Addressing confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability 
 
An important thing to note about our system is that 
only wearable’s original base station may inform it that 
it is safe again, because it has knowledge of properties 
unique to its personal fog, such as MAC addresses, a 
pre-shared unique ID of its personal fog, and a pre-
shared unique key known only to the base station and 
the device itself. While some of this information, such 
as the MAC address and basic device information, is 
publicly available through a Bluetooth information 
request, the specific ID of the personal fog service and 
the pre-shared key should only be known to trusted 
devices and, being 128 bits long, are essentially not 
guessable by an attacker. We maintain the same level 
of confidentiality of our original app with the fostering 
approach.  It increases the availability of our app data 
by dispersing the responsibility of informing base 
stations and wearable devices of an insecure 
environment. This way, should there be a 
disconnection from the cloud or a rapid change in the 
environment, our app is able to maintain its availability 
for local sharing. By restricting fostering to quieting a 
device, we ensure the integrity of our app data. It is not 
possible for an attacker to claim they are safe and 
prevent the app from recognizing an existing unsafe 
environment, as the app will continue to try to foster 
with other base stations in the area. 
 
5. Implementation 
 
To illustrate the communication protocol within a 
personal fog, we rely on the Bluetooth wearable 
testbed. This testbed, seen in Figure 6, is composed of 
three Raspberry Pi 3s, which can simulate currently 
available wearable devices using the Sense HAT add-
on, USB connection of sensors, and built-in Bluetooth 
capabilities. The testbed provides extra processing 
power and Wi-Fi communication capabilities above 
current wearable technology. This additional 
processing power means a Raspberry Pi can be a client 
or a server at any given time, which allows the 
Raspberry Pis to simulate both the wearable edge and 
the base station within a personal fog.  Using the 
Raspberry Pi as a simulated wearable, we avoid issues 
with proprietary APIs. By simulating the base station, 
we remove the need to port our application and 
experiments to different phones. The Raspberry Pi that 
is simulating the phone layer can communicate through 
Wi-Fi to the cloud, giving us a full simulation of each 
layer of our personal fog, as shown in Figure 2. 
We implemented our original app (from Section 3) 
onto the Raspberry Pis, which migrated it to the 
personal fog, using devices B and C in Figure 6 to act 
as wearable devices connected to device A, which acts 
as the phone or base station. To implement our app, we 
used the Pybluez python library to handle the 
Bluetooth communication between the devices. After 
validating the app functionality on the hardware, we 
then forced a communication disruption with a 
Page 5569
 command from either the cloud or the phone, 
designating device C to represent either the base 
station or a wearable device that is disconnected, 
depending on the fostering solution we target.  We 
assume from this point on that all devices are 
communicating from within our app using the same 
service ID and, when in the same personal fog, using a 
private personal fog service ID. 
 
 
Figure 6. Three Raspberry Pi 3s used to test 
our solution 
 
5.1. Fostering a wearable 
 
As described in Section 4.2, the personal fog we 
construct allows for three types of fostering – wearable 
fostering by a base station, base station fostering by 
another base station, and wearable fostering by another 
wearable. We first examine wearable fostering by a 
base station. When a wearable (recall that it is a 
Raspberry Pi on the personal fog edge in our 
architecture) disconnects from its original base station, 
it can seek to be fostered by another base station 
(another Raspberry Pi) to discover the current 
environment’s security state. It first sends an inquiry to 
all discoverable Bluetooth devices in range, asking for 
the services running on the devices. It may receive 
multiple responses, which when parsed identify valid 
base stations.  
The wearable attempts to connect to the one of the 
valid base stations by sending a connection request as 
shown in the sequence diagram in Figure 7. If the base 
station is its original one, it will attempt connection 
with that first. If this reconnection is unsuccessful, it 
will choose another valid base station that responded.  
Because of the fluidity of the environment, it only 
waits 5 seconds for a base station response before 
choosing a new one to foster with. If all choices are 
exhausted, it waits 1 minute before inquiring again. 
When a base station receives a connection request 
from a wearable, it accepts the connection to begin 
fostering. Fostering occurs when the base station 
signals the wearable that the environment is “unsafe”. 
After sending this message, the base station does not 
accept any data communication from the wearable 
other than what is shown in Figure 7 in the 
confirmation (reply) packet to maintain security within 
the base station. If the wearable attempts to send 
unexpected information, our app assumes it is an 
attacker attempting to gain access to the base station, 
which alerts its user regarding the unsafe environment, 
and quiets its personal fog.  
Once the wearable sends its confirmation packet, it 
disconnects and quiets itself, making it invisible to 
devices that have not already attempted a connection to 
it. It stores all sensor information it collects to be 
broadcast to its base station when it is properly 
reconnected. When quieted, our app on the wearable 
refuses all connection attempts that are not from its 
original base station, as described in Section 4.3.   
Fostering does not occur if the base station informs 
the wearable that the environment is “safe”. With this 
information, the wearable does not initially assume that 
it is truly in a secure environment because the base 
station could be used by an attacker. In this case, the 
wearable does not provide any personal information to 
the potential attacker, as the attacker does not know the 
service ID used by the fostered devices personal fog. 
Instead, the wearable attempts to connect to other valid 
base stations. If no base station identified in the first 
inquiry informs the wearable that it is unsafe, the 
wearable remains active and accepts communication 
from devices which attempt connection using the 
service ID unique to its personal fog, which we 
describe in Section 5.3. 
To validate this solution, we set up a personal fog 
containing device B (Figure 6) as a wearable device 
and device A as the base station for one user. Device C 
represents another user’s wearable which lost contact 
with its base station. Once device C recognizes its 
disconnection, it attempts find a base station to foster 
with. When a base station is found, it attempts to 
connect. Upon connection, A informs C that the state 
of the current environment is unsafe. C stops all 
transmission and remains in a state awaiting 
reconnection. A second experiment has A inform C 
that the state of the current environment is safe. Since 
there are no other base stations available, C does not 
send information to A and remains actively collecting 
data until it can transmit it to its base station.  
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Figure 7. Wearable fostering protocol when environment is unsafe 
 
 
5.2. Fostering a base station 
 
In some instances, wearables may remain 
connected to their base station, but the base station 
might not be informed that their environment is 
“unsafe.” This might be due to a missed update from 
the cloud or an attacker changing environments. 
To better secure personal devices and utilize local 
expertise, base stations from separate fog networks can 
connect to each other, as a form of fostering, to inform 
one another of perceived changes in the environment. 
For example, if a security conscious user, located in 
a coffee shop, noticed a potential attacker or threat, a 
user employing our app will designate himself as 
unsafe, thus shutting off the communication of 
personal data within his or her personal fog network. 
However, other personal fog networks in the area 
managed by less aware users, which run the app, might 
not be immediately privy to the potential threat. 
Fostering introduces the awareness to share this 
knowledge through the temporary connection of base 
stations in distinct personal fogs.  
Once a base station has switched to “unsafe” mode 
and communicated the state to its personal fog, it runs 
an inquiry to discover other base stations in the area. 
Responding base stations treat this unsafe base station 
as a wearable and accept a connection, expecting to 
foster the device. Our unsafe base station sends 
“unsafe” to the fostering base station, as shown in 
Figure 7. Because the external base station is not 
expecting information in a confirmation packet it 
assumes it is unsafe and informs the user, currently 
with a pop-up notification, that it may be in an insecure 
environment. The user is then given the choice to 
ignore the situation and continue sending and receiving 
personal information from their personal fog or to heed 
the warning and quiet its personal fog devices.  
To validate this solution, we shifted the device C 
(Figure 6) into a base station configuration and 
connected a Bluetooth speaker playing music to it. We 
then set the primary fog devices, A and B, into an 
insecure environment. The primary fog immediately 
attempted to connect to device C and sent an unsafe 
message. Upon receipt, we heeded the warning and 
stopped communication, causing our Bluetooth speaker 
to stop receiving music while remaining connected. 
 
5.3. Intra-fog synchronization 
 
Fostering wearables and fostering base stations 
provide two scenarios where devices from two 
independent fog networks might establish inter-fog 
communications to share security information about 
the environment. Once inter-fog fostering has occurred 
for a wearable and it has quieted itself due to an 
“unsafe” message, intra-fog fostering can be used to 
propagate its knowledge to the wearables within its 
original personal fog.  Intra-fog synchronization, or 
wearable to wearable fostering, is needed if the base 
station of personal fog in question has not received the 
unsafe information or a wearable receives an “unsafe” 
message through fostering after being disconnected 
from the base station.  
For this type of fostering, the previously fostered 
wearable with the “unsafe” knowledge performs an 
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inquiry specifically looking for wearables with the 
private service ID known only to members of its 
personal fog. It connects to all wearables that respond 
and sends them the "unsafe” message. This protocol is 
different from what is shown in Figure 7 because the 
wearable sending the inquiry is also the wearable 
sending the “unsafe” message. In this case, the 
receiving wearable reacts as if it is receiving the 
message from a fostering base station. Thus, it quiets 
itself and disconnects.  
To maliciously use the intra-fog communication 
method, an attacker would need to know the private 
fog service ID. As this ID is not shared publicly, it is 
unlikely they will be able to access it. If the attacker 
somehow manages to gain access to this private ID, 
they are only able to quiet the wearables of the 
personal fog, preventing any personal information from 
being obtained by the attacker.  
To validate intra-fog communication on the 
architecture, we set our three Raspberry Pis (Figure 6) 
up as one fog with two wearables, B and C, with A, as 
a base station connected to a Bluetooth speaker. Once 
device A became insecure, it connected to one of the 
wearable devices, in this case device B, and told them 
it was insecure. Device B immediately became 
insecure and attempted to connect to device C which 
was in its fog. After connecting on the service unique 
to its fog, it told the device C it was unsafe and device 
C stopped all communication. After changing the 
service on device A so it was seen as a member of the 
fog belonging to devices B and C, we told them they 
were secure again and all devices began functioning 
normally.  
 
5.4. Addressing confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability 
 
By design, our fostering app maintains our original 
apps focus on confidentiality. We maintain the 
integrity of the wearable date using our fostering 
approach by only acting on unsafe messages and 
disconnecting from a fostering device after only one 
message. Our app remains available to those around it 
through the base stations at all times, but will not allow 
an attacker to gain any information because of the 
instant disconnection. In addition, data and knowledge 
of unsafe environments increases availability than in 
the prior solution.  
 
6. Evaluation 
 
While we can demonstrate a working prototype, we 
need to show that a real-world application is possible 
moving forward.  To do this, we need to show that, for 
a given area, we can ensure that all or most devices 
running our application can foster their wearables, if 
needed, with at least one other device. To test how this 
would work in a real-world environment, we created a 
simulation which allowed users with Bluetooth 
wearables to move around a pre-set environment. We 
allowed modification of the Bluetooth communication 
range, the number of users of our app, the size of the 
area the users were in, and the speed at which users 
could move.  
We tested this method on three different sized 
locations, 10001000 ft., 500500 ft., and 250250 ft., 
with 10, 30, 50, and 100 users in the area with the app. 
We define a time-step as every 2 seconds and assume 
that each user can move a maximum of 25 ft. per time 
step, which puts us at the maximum speed of 8.5 miles 
per hour. This speed is about average running pace of 
an adult. This speed does not flood the network with 
data, a concern in a crowded environment sending 
information to the cloud via Wi-Fi, but is also fast 
enough that we are able to ensure that we do not miss 
any connections that may be made between moving 
devices. We also assume a Bluetooth range of 50 ft., 
which is well within consistent Bluetooth 
communication range, which can range from less than 
33 ft. all the way up to 328 ft., with most devices 
hitting between 33 and 60 ft. [3]. Each simulation was 
run for a total of 40 seconds, or 20 time-steps. We ran 
each setting 100 times to average out any 
inconsistencies that may occur in individual runs.  
The results of this simulation can be seen in Table 
1. As we should expect, the more crowded a general 
area is, the more often all nodes are able to connect to 
at least one other node within 40 seconds. This 
connection shares only one thing, if the fog is in a 
secure environment or not. No other personal 
information is shared between devices or fogs.  
It is important to note that each of the sizes we 
tested is larger than an average coffee shop. This 
shows that, even for a relatively low number of users, 
our application is viable for almost any traditional 
retail location. In fact, our smallest tested size, 
250250 ft., is more square footage than an acre of 
land. Even with this huge size, we still only had 4.7% 
of devices fail to connect to another device over 100 
runs of our simulation with as few as 10 users. 
 
Table 1. Percentage of nodes which failed to 
connect to at least one other node 
10 30 50 100
250 4.7 0.333333 0.04 0
500 32.7 5.5 1.5 0.18
1000 72.5 38.03333 21 5.3
Size of 
Location
% of Nodes Never 
Connected
Number of Users
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 7. Conclusion and future work  
 
In this paper, we extended our previous work 
regarding Bluetooth privacy and security in insecure 
environments by introducing the concept of a personal 
fog to respond to potential security or privacy threats 
more quickly. Additionally, we introduced the concept 
of fostering fogs to allow for expert opinions of 
insecure environments, allowing co-located users of 
our application to respond to newly developing threats 
more quickly. Finally, we showed our application is 
feasible on wearable devices which have control of 
Bluetooth communication by testing our application on 
a testbed built using Raspberry Pi 3s, and showed the 
feasibility of our app in the wild at various user 
densities. 
This app still has room for improvement. Primarily, 
it is still possible for an attacker to prevent a large 
group of users from communicating with their 
wearable devices by using our app and claiming they 
are insecure. While this is not a problem from a data 
interception standpoint, it could cause users to stop 
trusting our app if they are always being told they are 
unsafe. Additionally, our app does require an existing 
user base with at least some users being security 
conscious enough to recognize unsafe environments 
where an attacker may be eavesdropping. Without a 
somewhat large initial security conscious user base, it 
is possible for an attacker to flood the system with 
“safe” signals at a given location and ensure our app 
would never recognize the insecurity of that location.  
Moving forward, we plan to continue working with 
the concept of a personal fog with wearable devices, 
their base station, and the cloud to provide increased 
data security and privacy in insecure environments. We 
plan to examine our fog system with wearable devices 
which connect to additional sensors. This behavior is 
already being seen in consumer devices, such as the 
Apple Watch and AirPods.  
There is also a need for greater analysis of our 
fostering method to ensure that no additional security 
threats are introduced, including an attacker being able 
to lower battery life of wearable devices through 
attacking a device with this app running on it. As there 
is currently not a formal definition of trust in relation 
to Bluetooth device communication, this research 
would greatly benefit from a study examining this. As 
Bluetooth is always improving, this research will need 
to be updated with newer versions of the Bluetooth 
standard to ensure that no new security holes are 
created. This includes looking into security issues 
arising from Bluetooth 5G. Finally, there is a need to 
examine possible security attacks on wearable devices 
more deeply and how our method can be used to 
provide additional security and privacy to a user. 
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